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The Rule of Lies
One should not have any doubts that future analysts will carefully scrutinize this
period where the present generations happen to live. It will be noted as an outstanding
phase in our history, a period when we have been separated from the world, an integral
part of which we are, and as a stage of severe disputes with our international surroundings.
Above all, it will be remembered as unbearable and as long as a lean-year-may-be phase
of the ongoing disaster, a historical interval of irredeemable losses and general downfall.
In the sphere of the economy, losses and damage are so immense that even the least
informed are fully aware of them. They have accumulated for too long a time and have
reached such a scope that their analysis has already become habitual and uninspiring.
Nevertheless, how could we neglect the fact that, after a series of years wherein the
economy produced losses, these losses in 1999 accounted for over 20 per cent of the
GDP? How could we forget that the outgoing decade has been a period of negative net
investments and that the consequences of such a departure from regular developmental
processes are felt everywhere?
The plants are hopelessly old, with no chance of achieving anything worthwhile on
the world market. Infrastructure is falling apart – it is said that even life itself could
become impossible in parts of Vojvodina, due to neglected irrigation canals and the
leakage of ground waters. The state of repair of urban infrastructure is best seen when
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FRY 1999 1999 III 2000 III 2000 III 2000 I-III 2000
Basic Economic Indicators 1998 II 2000 III 1999 I-III 1999
GDP - USD million "14,224a)" -19.3% … … … …
Montenegro … … … … … …
Serbia … … … … … …
GDP per capita - USD "1,699a)" -19.1% … … … …
Montenegro … … … … … …
Serbia … … … … … …
Central Serbia … … … … … …
Vojvodina … … … … … …
Industrial Production … -24.1% … 8.5% 3.2% -5.3%
Montenegro … -7.6% … 8.6% 1.0% -2.7%
Serbia … -25.6% … 8.5% 3.2% -5.5%
Central Serbia … -24.5% … 8.9% 9.3% -1.6%
Vojvodina … -28.2% … 7.8% -9.0% -13.9%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% … … … …
Montenegro 154 -14.1% 181 14.6% 2.8% -1.4%
Serbia 102 -33.8% 82 2.5% -41.0% -37.0%
Unemployment Rate 27.3% 8.3% … … … …
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% … … … …
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% 27.4% 1.1% … …
Export - USD million "1,498" -46.9% 142 14.1% -5.0% -21.7%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 11 56.9% 14.8% 20.7%
Serbia "1,375" -48.9% 131 12.0% -6.3% -24.6%
Import - USD million "3,296" -30.3% 275 -2.7% 0.2% -6.7%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 16 -24.1% -27.5% -24.1%
Serbia "2,938" -33.2% 259 -0.8% 2.6% -4.2%
"Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion" 16.4 51.9% 17.7 2.9% 49.0% 51.1%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 6.1 1.7% 21.3% 28.1%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 11.6 3.6% 69.3% 68.0%
"Real money supply, end of period, DM million" 739 -42.3% 671 -2.2% -45.3% -43.6%
"Market exchange rate, monthly level" 4.25% -38.8% 5.27% 15.8% -22.7% -32.95%
Retail prices … 42.4% … 2.9% 54.4% 53.1%
Montenegro … 60.1% … 2.8% 131.3% 131.1%
Serbia … 41.1% … 2.9% 49.8% 48.3%
Cost of living … 44.9% … 2.7% 62.0% 60.8%
Montenegro … 67.2% … 2.6% 142.4% 143.9%
Serbia … 43.5% … 2.7% 56.3% 54.8%
Industrial prices … 44.2% … 15.6% 89.4% 74.7%
Montenegro … 63.7% … 4.1% 137.1% 135.0%
Serbia … 43.2% … 16.6% 86.5% 71.1%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 22.5 7.1% 132.4% 135.6%
a) Official statistics, without Kosovo, unreliable
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Belgrade’s trams threaten to hit the sky bouncing on dilapidated rails, while those who
wish to stay sane should not look at the facades of Belgrade’s buildings. 
There is no end to the sad story of the country’s economic tragedy of the country.
Here we shall not develop this story further, as the things it relates to are painfully clear.
This, however, is not the only disaster that befell our society and took hold of its vital parts.
Contamination of the political sphere
There are wide areas, which although not so obvious, are no less dangerous, wherein
far-reaching consequences, like deep and indelible scars, will probably remain visible for
much longer than those of the economic disaster itself. We may safely speak about the
occurrence of a demographic, psychological, ethical, cultural, etc. tragedy. Here we shall
talk about one specific calamity that covered the entire society, less visible to the naked
eye. It has to do with a heavy degradation and tragic contamination of the Yugoslav
political sphere. And only with a specific type of contamination referring to intense
violations of the truth, serving as a form of political strategy and an effective means of
ruling. 
Things we could not believe in before have been happening in Yugoslav politics for
over a decade. Year after year top political officials have been promising an increase of
the national product, export, employment, living standard, etc. by percentages which
make one dizzy, but when the year is over and not even a quarter of what has been
promised is delivered, nobody bats an eye! Instead of timid excuses and humble attempts
to explain some of those colossal failures, the same team of prominent personalities
starts to shower the public with new promises!
Indeed, that would not have been possible without a moral catastrophe caused by
the same subjects and within the same arrangement, leading to a disregard of the
essential imperatives of humanity and fundamental requirements of decency.
When morality is thrown under one’s feet everything seems to be possible and
nightmarish scenes become everyday life. One cannot do anything but cry with
resignation: Omnia iam fiunt, fieri quae posse negabam, et nihil est, de quo non sit
habenda fides. Indeed, everything I declared impossible actually happened and there is
nothing one may consider inconceivable any more. 
When officials of the ruling policy start up with new waves of promises, having flown
over the horrifying abysses between what they had promised and what had been
attained, it could be described in many different ways, but all of them negative. Perhaps
the word indecency is the most appropriate one to explain what we could deem a miracle
never seen before. Because, what else, if not indecent, is behavior consisting of repeated
promises of paradise in a desert land where, instead of long promised rapid railways and
the grapes of large investment cycles, we, with no dignity, consume the leftovers of
material funds inherited from our socialist past?
Lies - the predominant style
The lie has unfortunately become predominant. Moreover, it seems that it bears fruit.
There is no impression that those who use it in abundance are heading towards
repentance. The people used to say that lies are short lived. This old wisdom is seemingly
no longer valid. Lies have apparently become powerful instruments for the achievement
of all possible goals, private as well as public. 
By the way, as politics has been vastly privatized, the difference between private and
public interests is almost non-existent. Individuals are closely identified with the state,
and the state looks more like private property. One could not do anything but avoid it in
all possible ways, as even common decency requires that one should not be trespassing.
There remains a question of what enables such an exploitation of lies in our society, why
they pay off, primarily in the political sense and what happened to traditional
mechanisms which used to initiate reaction and punish lies mercilessly in a much
different society. 
The answer to this important question requires much more space, which we haven’t
got here. And who would be able to answer it truthfully and convincingly? Still, the
answer could be found in a dreadful distinction of our political system where one
extremely powerful political subject takes the center of the stage, surrounded by
numerous and incomparably lesser actors. Economists are fully aware that it is not a
situation ensuring real competition. And without real competition there could be very
little social rationality and action efficiency, and still less individual responsibility.
The powers-that-be can do anything they want. What hangs over their heads like
Damocles’ sword turns into an additional instrument of their power. Everything goes
backwards, as one of our poets says, and people are getting used to something they have
and will always find disgusting. The engineers of lies have managed to pollute even the
people. In the future, if there is to be one, a moral revolution must be carried out, along
with political, economic and cultural revolutions. The issue of its actors still remains unresolved.
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Privatization in Serbia
Milan R. Kovaãeviç
In the then much larger country, private investments were acclaimed in 1988.
Privatization of social capital began a year later. Its beginning, based on a compromise
between the much needed transition and the old system, was hard. Already in 1990 the
law was changed, accelerated privatization. The share of social capital in total capital
was reduced primarily by investments of the employed. Serbia went further than the rest
of the country. By August 1991, 1,211 enterprises were privatized through private
investments, while social capital was privatized in 9 enterprises. 
In August 1991, Serbia gave up the federal law, passing its own Law on Privatization
and slowing down the process radically, while some arrangements were annulled.
Investments were lesser, but due to rising inflation, social capital became cheaper and
thus easy to purchase. By the end of January 1994, 684 enterprises were privatized with
the complete sale of 454 and investments of additional capital in an additional 230. 
Significant results were scored. Of the total 3,678 socially owned enterprises in
August 1991, 1,220 had already been privatized under the federal law. In 253 cases,
privatization was repeated, while 684 enterprises were privatized under the republican
law and the privatization process began in 921 enterprises. A total of 2,572 enterprises
were thus covered, accounting for 70% of all enterprises suitable for privatization. 
Privatization and Statism
Parallel to privatization, state ownership of large portions of social capital in the
sectors of infrastructure, traffic, energy, forestry, communication, public utilities, etc,
rose at a still higher rate. By the end of January 1994, according to my findings, 44% of
capital was already privatized and 42% was nationalized to the state. 
Meanwhile, many private enterprises were founded. By the end of 1990, they
numbered 22,000, increasing to 175,000 at the end of 1993, though many ceased to
exist later on. At the end of 1997 only 73,857 enterprises submitted final balance sheets.
The share of the private sector in capital, employment and social product remained
modest. But with respect to profitability, it was far more efficient than the social and
state sectors. 
Unfortunately, in 1994 the law was changed so that the Minister of Finance
came to announce daily a revaluation of already purchased stocks and demanded extra
payments. This resulted in the functional annulment of privatization while privatized
capital was reduced to a mere 4% of total capital. Long court procedures on behalf of a
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half million shareholders began, with some of it continuing to this date. The Federal
Constitutional Court ruled that "the establishment of the value of social capital for sale
is not subject to contracts, but rather to laws and regulations," while the Serbian
Constitutional Court waited until last year to declare that an investigation into the
constitutionality of stock annulment was out of order, since a new law had been passed.
The Constitution of a single-party Serbia of 1990 still guarantees equal protection to
social, state and private property and safeguards the principle of management and
possession on the basis of property and labor. There are no guarantees for private
property and no sound commitment to privatization. Statism and market suffocation are
thereby the outcome of many current state measures. 
Lessened Foreign Investment
This was not about the extra payment of stocks at all, as proved by the fact that
until 1997 there had been no privatization. Under the new law employees were given as
much as 60% of privatized capital without payment. Still nobody thinks of those who
were deprived of stocks through nationalization. Meanwhile, city plots were transferred
from social to state ownership. Only flats were privatized almost free of charge. External
debt was increased (amounting to USD 1.5 billion, according to the IBRD), and internal
debt based on the old currency savings and other state debts has also risen, while, on
the other hand, the state gives capital away for free. Many foreign investors are
prohibited from purchasing breweries, cement factories, chemical facilities, food industry
facilities, etc. For every year of service, the law promises employees a gift of DM 400.
According to the balance sheets of all enterprises at the end of 1998, total fixed
capital was 423 billion dinars, while state capital accounted for 137 billion or 33% of the
total, and social capital for 170 billion dinars, or 40% of the total. The bulk of reserves,
amounting to 26 billion dinars, are concentrated in private capital while losses, which
come to 107 billion dinars, are found primarily in state and social capital so that the
share of the latter in total capital is continuously falling.
Income statements in 1998 indicated the relatively greater success of private over
state and social enterprises. The results were the following (in billion dinars):
State and Social Mixed Private
Profits 1.9 2.1 3.0
Losses -16.1 -15.2 -2.3
Profits tax 0 -0.1 -0.2
Net loss- and profit + -14.2 -13.2 0.5
Reportedly, around 7.000 enterprises were ready for privatization in 1998 but it
seems that the figure was underestimated. At the end of 1998, 74,430 enterprises
submitted final balance sheets, whereas 5,230 socially owned and 3,400 with mixed
ownership. Interestingly, the estimated capital value was considered in 2,600 enterprises
at the initiation of privatization. Such valuation is obligatory according to the federal Law
on Enterprises and the Law on the Transformation of Social Capital. Several regulations
passed in accordance with this legislation are in conflict with the enacted law on
privatization in Serbia. Obviously, estimation and practice stand wide apart. 
Three Years of the Law
Soon it will be three years since the passage of the present law and by April 20, only
230 enterprises completed the second round of privatization. This is not the end of it, as
they are left with 10-30% of non-privatized capital transferred to the funds. From the
total of 8,600 enterprises assigned for privatization in 1998, only 354 or 4% entered the
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first round of the free distribution of shares. The sale, of course, goes slowly. The total
capital of enterprises which started privatization amounts to 20.6 billion dinars, social
capital 17.4 billion dinars and donated capital 11.1 billion dinars. These enterprises
employ 136.000 people, where those with the priority gained two-thirds of the total gift,
thus there are insufficient shares remaining for others. Privatization preserves the self-
managing system and goes at a speed that requires decades. Is this done intentionally?
The answer to the question of why shares have been slowly accepted - even for free
- is far from simple. An inferior design of the law may offer part of the explanation.
The hitherto annulment of shares has reduced the understanding of a share
to something like a security. "Past service" of non-qualified workers and managers has
been equalized value-wise when distributing shares. The young and unemployed are
not eligible for the gift. Employees are aware of the small and shrinking value of their
shares. The gift of around DM 400 was quickly reduced to only DM 100, due to inflation
and devaluation of the dinar. Experience so far does not indicate any intention for
genuine privatization. The competent ministry does not do even what it is obliged to
under the law. 
Initial figures on allotted dividends were published in advertisements placed in the
daily Politika on April 16, 2000 as follows: 
Metalac Pivara Sintelon Telefonkabl
Nominal share value, dinars 60 600 600 1,230
Estimated in 1998, day/month 2/4 30/9 30/9 31/7
Share value on  31.12. 99 115 978 978 2,165
Paid dividens per share, dinars 550 6 18 100
% dividend from nominal value 7 1 3 8
% dividend from share value: 31.12.99 3.6 0.6 1.8 4.6
Obviously, the figures on paid dividends per share of "Metalac" Gornji Milanovac are
false. Apatin brewery ("Pivara") did not announce the date of the calculation of its
nominal share value. Figures for "Sintelon" and "Telefonkabl" indicate that the paid
dividends account for 1-8% of nominal share value, and only 0.6-4.6% of estimated
share value. 
Quickly Aging Valuations
From the same source comes the figure that the shares of "Sintelon" have recently
sold at 440 dinars each. This amounts to only 45% of the estimated revised share value
at the end of last year. It does not seem logical that share buyers still pay the revised
value of shares purchased in the second round, even though they are aware that it is far
beyond the real price. Rapid deterioration of estimated values due to loss making instead
of the planned profits is commonplace. 
The non-market orientation of the law is visible in two unsustainable regulations on
secondary trade in shares originating from privatization. The prescribed right of
exclusive trade given to exchange brokers through financial exchange market represents
an unsustainable monopoly and an attack on the stock market. Only chosen shares
which fulfil particular conditions should be found at the stock exchange. And in normal
exchange transactions the shareholders have been unable to exercise the "right of first
refusal" as also prescribed. 
Obviously, the present privatization concept is far from optimal, but underground
privatization or no privatization at all is even worse. Social and state capital maintain
monopolies and linkage between government and economy which are directed against
the market economy, but without any market economy whatsoever there can be no
democratic society.
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Though it was expected, there was no statistical presentation of a high rate of inflation in March. As two-digit
inflation for March was not announced, this will be compensated for by a future monthly rate correction. Industrial
production in the first quarter is down by 5.3% year-on-year. In the first three months of 2000, the foreign-trade
deficit of Serbia was USD 467 million. Continued expansion of money supply, with a significant change in its
structure, is the basic chara-cteristic of monetary
policy in the first quarter. 
Prices and wages
Though we announced in the March issue of
the Review a final identification of the real situation,
the Federal Statistics Bureau published surprising
figures again. According to its statement, March
retail price growth in Serbia in March amounted to
2.9%, in and 2.8% in Montenegro, while inflation,
measured by movement in the costs of living, was
slightly lower: 2.7% in Serbia and 2.6% in
Montenegro.
A clear deviation from the expected inflation in
March emerged after the new (old) trick was applied,
by which the presentation of high monthly inflation
is avoided by a correction of the price movement for
an earlier period. On the other hand, industrial
prices rose by 15.5% (16% in Serbia and 4.1% in
Montenegro). Inflation measured by the retail price
movement in the first quarter accounts for only
5,2%, while industrial price rose by 24,1%. As
illustrated in the chart, methodologically derived
artificial deviations in retail price movement
obviously must be corrected for in the last quarter of
1999 and partially in the first quarter of 2000. 
The essence of the problem is not in the
method by which inflation is presented, but in
enormous price controls. The creation of dual prices – one on the controlled market and the other in the zone of
the shadow economy - was used to cloak the real inflation rate. As was pointed out in the March issue of the
Review, hidden inflation was identified primarily in liquid oil derivatives – petrol and diesel - though similar
episodes are possible with other goods under similar pricing regimes – e.g. bread, milk, cooking oil, meat, tobacco, etc. 
The mechanism for covering up price growth is simple. Between periods of price growth, the state statistics
use inflated prices although goods can not be
purchased at that price. Meanwhile, on the black
market there are much higher prices where the
majority of consumers do their shopping. The black
market price is significantly higher as the risk is
being calculated in it. In reality, therefore, inflation
should have been expressed earlier, but that was
evaded deliberately. 
Following an increase of controlled prices and
the subsequent arrival of goods in regular flows,
prices appear to fall, as consumers can now
purchase goods with prices lower than those on the
black market. State statistics in that month apply
the new prices, correcting the inflation rate in the
prior months with a late admission of reality. By this
technique we can explain the outcome wherein
liquid oil and fuel prices, according to the retail price
index, are actually down by 4.1%. With industrial
prices, this sort of manipulation was plainly
impossible as it was about domestic producers who,
at least from the standpoint of official statistics,
were not subject to price controls. We shall wait for
the forthcoming publications of the Federal
Statistics Bureau to support this claim. The utility of
state indicators is certainly diminished, while similar
manipulation through the rest of this year should be
expected. Though such a cover up with unclear or
illogical motifs seems innocent, it transfers disturbances to other parts of economy by limiting what little remains
of market transparency.
April retail price movement in Montenegro confirmed our prognosis that a further decline of the monthly growth in
prices would occur. For the first time since September 1999, monthly price growth in Montenegro was lower than that in Serbia. 
The average wage in Serbia in March remained stable at DM 82, while in Montenegro it rose sharply to DM
181. The average pension in Serbia is DM 64, and in Montenegro it is DM 154.
Industry
March industrial production rose 8.5% relative to February. In Montenegro it increased by 8.6%, and by 8.5%
in Serbia. In Serbia proper production growth amounted to 8.9% in contrasted to 7.8% growth in Vojvodina.
According to the official Statistics Statement, No.81, industrial production in February was corrected by 0.7% for
the FRY and 0.8% for Serbia.
Production fell in 9 sectors – black metallurgy (-20.3%), wood processing (-11.3%), oil derivatives (-11.1%),
non-metal production (-6.3%), iron ore production (-5.9%), paper production and processing (-5.2%), final wood
products (-2.6%), electric machines and appliance production (-2.3%), and linen and flex production (-1.0%), while
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in all other sectors the production was increased by between +1.1% in graphics and +89.3% in shipbuilding. 
March industrial production in FRY rose by 3.2% year-on-year. The growth in Montenegro was 1.0% year-
on-year and 3.2% in Serbia year-on-year. In Serbia proper production was increased by 9.3% year-on-year, while
in Vojvodina it was reduced by 9.0% year-on-year. Twenty three sectors experienced growth, ranging from +4.4%
(oil and gas production) to +219.5 (iron ore production), while twelve sectors witnessed declines between –67.2%
(oil derivatives production) and –3.4% (coal production). 
Industrial production of the FRY in the first three months of 2000 was down by 5.3% year-on-year. Using the
so-called level index, which mitigates the effects of accidental factors on the rise and fall of production by
averaging down the monthly indices, we can confirm the real fall of production. According to this more realistic
indicator, production actually fell in the first quarter. It is down 2.7% in Montenegro and down 5.5%. In Serbia
proper production fell by 1.6%, and by 13.9% in
Vojvodina. 
Industrial production in the whole of the FRY
was down in March by 69.8% relative to March
1989, while the first quarter of 2000 is down by
69.3% relative to the same period in 1989.
Foreign Trade
In the first quarter of 2000, Serbian exports
were but 75.6% of that exported in the same period
last year, while imports fell by 2.9% year-on-year.
Serbia’s trade deficit in the first quarter was USD
467 million. Exports from Montenegro rose by
20.7% in the respective period while imports fell by
30.8% and the trade deficit was a relatively modest
USD 24 million. The import of consumer goods in
March was much higher than in the same month
last year, confirming the expectations of the March
issue of the Review.
Real effects of the tightened EU sanctions are
yet to be seen, although we can conclude now that
import prices will grow due to additional costs,
which will produce a series of further market
disturbances. 
Quite a logical consequence of such a situation
is the position maintained by the most important
export countries, Macedonia and Bosnia. Export to
Macedonia rose by 27.3% in the first quarter year-
on-year. Though trade with BiH has dropped 34.4%
in the last year, it continues to be the second most important trading partner for FRY. 
Monetary movements
In March there was a continued increase of
money supply and change to its structure, which
was reflected in the exchange rate movement on the
parallel foreign exchange market. In the first quarter
of this year, money supply was increased by 1.3
billion dinars. By the end of March, money supply
totaled 17.7 billion dinars. Relative to the end of
1999, the share of cash holdings in M1 was reduced
from 40.6% to 34.5%. Real money supply expressed
by the ponder values of cash and deposit holdings,
cont-inues its fall and registered at DM 671 million in
March. 
The Giro rate reached 28-30 dinars for 1 DM in
March, while the street (black) rate was around 22.5
(buying rate) or 23.5 (selling rate) dinars for 1 DM.
By the end of March the black market rate premium
was 275%, i.e. the black market rate was 3.75 times
higher than the official rate. On the parallel foreign
currency market, the US dollar remains
undervalued in relation to its movement on the
world market, partially due to the "danger" of
transactions in this currency. 
The market interest rate experienced mild
growth in March, rising 5.72%. In contrast, the
regulated interest rate, by which the banks
approved credits, fell from 3.9% to 3.4%. Therefore,
the artificially low inflation rate turns into a real
negative interest rate.  As such, disturbances to the real sphere are transferred to the monetary sphere of economy
as well. Credits at this rate from the exceptionally centralized banking system can only be used by privileged
companies demonstrating one of the methods behind "soft" budget constraints in Serbia. Banks try to invest
whatever is left through gray movements, thus placing additional pressure on the giro rate. 
Several other events marked the current month. It was announced that the dynamics of old currency savings
payment would be respected, as prescribed by the Law on Old Foreign Currency Deposits. Total obligations for
this year account for DM 183 million.  Federal obligations amount to DM 78 million, while the National Bank of
Yugoslavia and other authorized banks’ obligations are DM 55 million. Given the potential methods of financing
stated in the Law and the size of the amount in question, political variables could be crucial to fulfilling the
commitment. However, the announcement that the obligation will be fulfilled by other means, some of them quite
absurd, indicates that depositors should not look forward to a positive outcome. 
After the repeated devaluations of the dinar in Montenegro, in March to the level of 24 dinars for 1 DM, the
government in Podgorica announced a shift to a floating rate against German mark. This can be seen as another
step in a series of preventive measures as the hitherto system expressed insufficient flexibility.
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Yugoslavia in the mirror of Eastern Europe
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